We refute the conjecture that all negative translations are intuitionistically equivalent by giving two counterexamples. Then we characterise the negative translations intuitionistically equivalent to the usual ones.
Introduction
Informally speaking, classical logic CL is the usual logic in mathematics, and intuitionistic logic IL is obtained from classical logic by omitting:
• reductio ad absurdum ¬Ȧ˙⊥ A ;
• law of excluded middle A ∨ ¬A;
• law of double negation ¬¬A → A.
In this sense, IL is a weakening of CL, that is IL proves less theorems than CL.
At first sight it seems that IL is just poorer than CL. However, there is a gain in moving from CL to IL: the theorems of IL have nicer properties. The main properties gained are
(where A and B are sentences);
• existence property: if IL ⊢ ∃xA(x), then IL ⊢ A(t) for some term t (where ∃xA is a sentence). Arguably, these two properties are the key criteria to say that a logic is constructive.
On the one hand IL is weaker than CL, on the other hand IL is constructive while CL is not. Given these differences, it is surprising that CL can be faithfully embedded in IL by the so-called negative translations into IL. Negative translations into IL are functions N, mapping a formula A to a formula A N , that:
• embed CL into IL, that is CL ⊢ A ⇒ IL ⊢ A N ;
• are faithful, that is CL ⊢ A N ↔ A.
The image of the usual negative translations is (essentially) the negative fragment NF, that is the set of all formulas without ∨ and ∃ and whose atomic formulas are all negated. So NF is a faithful copy of CL inside IL. This is pictured in figure 1 . There are four negative translations into IL usually found in the literature (and recently two new ones were presented [5] ). They are introduced in table 1 and defined (by induction on the structure of formulas) in table 2. All these negative translations into IL are equivalent in IL: given any two of them, say M and N, we have IL ⊢ A M ↔ A N . This fact leads to the following conjecture that seems to be almost folklore:
if we rigorously define the notion of a negative translation into IL, then we should be able to prove that all negative translations are equivalent in IL.
Curiously, this conjecture apparently has never been studied before. In this article we study it, reaching the following conclusions.
• The conjecture is false and we give two counterexamples.
• The usual negative translations into IL are characterised by the following two equivalent conditions:
-to translate into NF in IL, that is A N is equivalent in IL to a formula in NF;
-to act as the identity on NF in IL, that is IL ⊢ A N ↔ A for all A ∈ NF. Table 1 : the four usual negative translations. 
Notions
In the rest of this article, CL denotes the pure first order classical predicate logic based on ⊥, ∧, ∨, →, ∀ and ∃ (where
and ≡ denotes syntactical equality) and IL and ML denote its intuitionistic and minimal counterparts, respectively. All formulas considered belong to the common language of CL, IL and ML. To save parentheses we adopt the convention that ∀ and ∃ bind stronger than ∧ and ∨, which in turn bind stronger than →. Let us start by motivating our definition of a negative translation.
The main feature of any negative translation N into IL is embedding CL into IL in the sense of CL ⊢ A ⇒ IL ⊢ A N . We can be even more ambitious and ask for (1) CL + Γ ⊢ A ⇒ IL + Γ N ⊢ A N where Γ is any set of formulas and Γ N := {A N : A ∈ Γ}. But embedding CL into IL alone does not seem to capture our intuitive notion of a negative translation. For example, it includes the trivial example A N :≡ ¬⊥. The problem with this example is that the meaning of A N is unrelated to the meaning of A. So require that a negative translation do not change the meaning of formulas, that is (2) A N ↔ A. This equivalence must not be taken in IL or ML, otherwise from (1) and (2) we would get CL = IL. So we take the equivalence in CL, that is CL ⊢ A ↔ A N .
Definition 1.
Let N be a function mapping each formula A to a formula A N .
• The following condition is called soundness theorem into IL (ML) of N: for all formulas A and for all sets Γ of possibly open formulas, we have the implication
• The following condition is called characterisation theorem of N: for all formulas A we have CL ⊢ A N ↔ A.
• We say that N is a negative translation into IL (ML) if and only if both the soundness theorem into IL (respectively, ML) of N and the characterisation theorem of N hold.
Remark 2. The soundness theorem into ML of N implies the soundness theorem into IL of N. So a negative translation into ML is in particular a negative translation into IL.
The conjecture that concerns us mentions equivalence in IL. For definiteness, we write down exactly what we mean by this. 
Later on we will see that what characterises the usual negative translations into IL are two properties related to NF. Again for definiteness we write down the definition of NF and of the two properties.
Definition 4. The negative fragment NF is the set of formulas inductively generated by:
• ⊥ ∈ NF;
• if P is an atomic formula, then ¬P ∈ NF;
Definition 5. Let N be a negative translation into IL.
• We say that N translates into NF in IL (ML) if and only if for all formulas A there exists a B ∈ NF such that IL ⊢ A N ↔ B (respectively, ML ⊢ A N ↔ B).
• We say that N acts as the identity on NF in IL (ML) if and only if for all
Gödel-Gentzen negative translation
We will choose the Gödel-Gentzen negative translation G as a representative of the usual negative translations into IL, so let us take a closer look at it.
We start by motivating the definition of G. It is known from proof theory that CL is conservative over ML with respect to NF, that is (1) for all A ∈ NF we have the implication CL ⊢ A ⇒ ML ⊢ A. This suggests us that one way of constructing a negative translation into ML is to rewrite each formula A as a formula A N ∈ NF. By rewriting we mean that A N still has the same meaning as A in the sense of (2) CL ⊢ A N ↔ A. Then (1) would give us the soundness theorem into ML of N (almost, because there is no Γ) and (2) would give us the characterisation theorem of N. The natural way of rewriting a formula A as a classically equivalent formula A N ∈ NF (that is having all atomic formulas P ≡ ⊥ negated and using only ⊥, ∧, → and ∀) is:
• rewrite atomic formulas P ≡ ⊥ as ¬¬P ;
• rewrite A ∨ B as ¬(¬A ∧ ¬B);
• rewrite ∃xA as ¬∀x¬A;
• there's no need to rewrite ⊥, A ∧ B, A → B and ∀xA.
If we formalise these rewritings as a definition of N by induction on the structure of formulas, then we get exactly G. As a "tagline" we can say: A G is the natural rewriting of A into NF.
Incidentally, Gödel's and Gentzen's negative translations differ only in the way they translate A → B: Gödel translates to ¬(A G ∧ ¬B G ) while Gentzen translates to A G → B G . By the above discussion, we find Gentzen's variant more natural and so we adopt it. Now we turn to the main properties of G. We can prove that G:
• is a negative translation into ML;
• translates into NF in ML;
• acts as the identity on NF in ML.
We can even prove strengthenings of the second and third properties above:
• for all formulas A we have A G ∈ NF;
• for all formulas A ∈ NF we have A G ≡ A (modulo identifying ¬¬¬P with ¬P for atomic formulas P ).
These two strengthenings are specific of G: they do not hold for Ko, Ku and Kr.
To finish this section we discuss G as a representative of the usual negative translations into IL. We can prove that Ko, G, Ku and Kr are equivalent in IL. So any of them can be taken as a representative of the usual negative translations into IL. We choose to take G as a representative due to nice syntactical properties of G like (A ↔ B) G ≡ A G ↔ B G and the two strengthenings above. These properties allow us to work many times with syntactical equalities instead of equivalences, thus avoiding the question of where (CL, IL or ML) the equivalences are provable.
Two negative translations not intuitionistically equivalent to the usual ones
Before we present our two counterexamples to the conjecture, let us draw a scale to roughly measure how provable or refutable a formula F is. This scale will be useful to picture our main theorem about the counterexamples. We draw the scale following this set of instructions.
• We plot along an axis all possible pairs of combinations of
• Actually, we do not plot impossible pairs (for example, "CL ⊢ F and IL ⊢ ¬F ") and redundant entries in pairs (for example, the entry "CL ⊢ F " in the pair "CL ⊢ F and IL ⊢ F ").
• The plotting is ordered from provability of F on the left to refutability of F on the right (for example, "IL ⊢ F " stands on the left of "CL ⊢ F and IL F " because "IL ⊢ F " states a stronger form of provability).
The resulting scale is pictured in figure 2 . Now we present our two counterexamples.
• The first counterexample N 1 is a weakening of G obtained by weakening A G to A G ∨ F (for suitable formulas F ).
• The second counterexample N 2 is a variant of G obtained by making ⊥ in A G "less false" in the sense of replacing ⊥ by
• IL⊢F strongly provable
• IL⊢¬F strongly refutable Figure 2 : scale of provability-refutability.
Definition 6. Fix a formula F . We define two functions N 1 and N 2 , mapping formulas to formulas, by
Since N 1 and N 2 depend on the chosen F , in rigour we should write something like A N 1 (F ) and A N 2 (F ) , but we avoid this cumbersome notation. We found N 2 in an article by Ishihara [13] and in a book chapter by Coquand [2, section 2.3]. Maybe Ishihara drew inspiration from an article by Flagg and Friedman [6] where a similar translation appears. It is even possible that N 2 is folklore.
For our two counterexamples to work, we need the formula F to be classically refutable but intuitionistically acceptable. In the next lemma we prove that there are such formulas F .
Lemma 7.
1. There exists a formula F such that CL ⊢ ¬F but IL ¬F .
Any such formula F is not equivalent in IL to a formula in NF.
Proof.
1. Let P be an unary predicate symbol. We are going to prove that F ≡ ¬∀xP (x) ∧ ∀x¬¬P (x) is such that CL ⊢ ¬F but IL ¬F . Since CL ⊢ ¬F is obvious, we move on to prove IL ¬F by showing that the Kripke model K from figure 3 forces F .
• K forces ¬∀xP (x) because no node forces ∀xP (x).
• K forces ∀x¬¬P (x) because every node k forces ¬¬P (d) for all d in its domain {0, . . . , k} since the node k + 1 forces P (d).
2. If F were equivalent in IL to a formula in NF, then ¬F would also be equivalent in IL to a formula in NF, so from CL ⊢ ¬F and the fact that CL is conservative over IL with respect to NF we would get IL ⊢ ¬F , contradicting point 1.
Now we prove our main theorem giving two counterexamples to the conjecture: N 1 and N 2 are negative translations into IL (even into ML) not equivalent in IL to the usual negative translations into IL (for suitable formulas F ). The claims of this theorem are summarised in figure 4.
. . .
• {0, 1, 2, 3} 3 P (0), P (1), P (2) Figure 4 : theorem 8 on the scale of provability-refutability.
Proof.
1. Consider an arbitrary formula F .
First let us consider the case of N 1 . By direct proof, consider an arbitrary set of formulas Γ and an arbitrary formula A, assume CL + Γ ⊢ A and let us prove
Since a proof in CL of A uses only finitely many formulas A 1 , . . . , A n from Γ, then CL + A 1 + · · · + A n ⊢ A. By the soundness theorem into ML of G we get
G by the deduction theorem of ML. • If for some A G i ∨ F we have the case F , then trivially A G ∨ F .
Let us show (2) ML
• Otherwise in all A G i ∨ F we have the case of A G i , so we have A
So we have (2) as we wanted. This argument is illustrated for n = 2 in figure  5 .
Now let us consider the case of N 2 . By direct proof, consider an arbitrary set of formulas Γ and an arbitrary formula A, assume CL + Γ ⊢ A and let us prove ML + Γ N 2 ⊢ A N 2 . By the soundness theorem into ML of G we get
Since ⊥ is treated as an arbitrary propositional letter in ML, we can replace ⊥ by F getting
n ⊢ A N 2 , as we wanted.
2. First let us consider the case of N 1 .
(⇒) By direct proof, assume that N 1 has a characterisation theorem and let us prove CL ⊢ ¬F . By the characterisation theorem of N 1 we have CL ⊢ ⊥ N 1 ↔ ⊥ where ⊥ N 1 ≡ ⊥ ∨ F , so CL ⊢ ¬F , as we wanted.
(⇐) By direct proof, assume CL ⊢ ¬F , consider an arbitrary formula A and let us prove CL ⊢ A N 1 ↔ A. By the characterisation theorem of G we have CL ⊢ A G ↔ A. Since CL ⊢ ¬F by assumption, it makes no difference in CL to replace (⇐) By direct proof, assume IL ⊢ ¬F , take an arbitrary formula A and let us prove IL ⊢ A N 1 ↔ A G . By the assumption it makes no difference in IL to replace (⇐) By direct proof, assume IL ⊢ ¬F , take an arbitrary formula A and let us prove
We saw in theorem 8 that N 1 and N 2 are two counterexamples to the conjecture (for suitable F ). Now in proposition 9 we clarify that these two counterexamples are different (for the same suitable F ). Proof. By direct proof, assume that CL ⊢ ¬F but IL ¬F and let us prove IL A N 1 ↔ A N 2 . We start by making two observations about Kripke models.
1. There exists a Kripke model K, with a bottom node, that forces ¬F .
Let us prove this claim. Since CL ⊢ ¬F by assumption, any classical model forces ¬F . Regarding a classical model as a Kripke model with only one node, we have a Kripke model, with a bottom node, forcing ¬F , as we wanted.
For example, for the F ≡ ¬∀xP (x) ∧ ∀x¬¬P (x) used in the proof of lemma 7, we can take K to be the Kripke model of figure 6.
• {0} P (0) 2. There exists a Kripke model L, with a bottom node, that forces F .
Let us prove this claim. Since IL ¬F by assumption, there exists a Kripke model L ′ that does not force ¬F , that is some node n ′ of L ′ does not force ¬F . Then there exists a node n above or equal to n ′ that forces F . By restricting L ′ to all the nodes above or equal to n we get a Kripke model L, with bottom node n, that forces F , as we wanted.
For example, for the F ≡ ¬∀xP (x) ∧ ∀x¬¬P (x) used in the proof of lemma 7, we can take L to be the Kripke model of figure 3 . Now let us return to our goal: IL
Consider a fresh nullary predicate Q ≡ ⊥. Since Q is fresh and Q ≡ ⊥,
• L forces ¬Q;
• we can force Q in K;
• forcing Q in K will not collide with K forcing ¬F .
The base nodes of K and L have (by definition of Kripke model) non empty domains. We can assume (renaming elements if necessary) that those domains share a common element d. Consider the Kripke model M from figure 7 obtained by:
• connecting a fresh bottom node 0, with domain {d}, to the bottom nodes of K and L;
• for every node n of M, forcing Q in n if and only if n forces ¬F ; or equivalently, forcing Q in K but not in L and 0. 
Note that M is well-defined because:
• the domains of M are monotone since {d} is contained in the domains of K and L;
• the forcing relation in M is monotone since Q is forced only in the entire K.
Now we argue that M does not force ( * ).
• The node 0 does not force ¬¬Q because L forces ¬Q.
• The node 0 does not force F because K forces ¬F .
• Let us show that the node 0 forces (Q → F ) → F , that is any node n does not force Q → F or forces F . We consider the following three cases.
-If n is in K, then n does not force Q → F because K forces Q (by construction of M) and ¬F .
-If n is in L, then n forces F because L forces F .
-If n is 0, then n does not force Q → F , otherwise K would force Q → F and we already saw that this is false.
We conclude that the node 0 does not force ( * ), as we wanted.
As a curiosity, let us see that we have the factorisations N 2 = FD • G and -all atomic subformulas P ≡ ⊥ by P ∨ F .
• The refined Friedman-Dragalin translation FD ′ maps each formula A to the formula A
Naming FD ′ a refinement of FD is a little bit misleading, as we explain now. On the one hand, FD ′ simplifies FD by dropping the replacement of atomic subformulas P ≡ ⊥ by P ∨ F . On the other hand,
• FD is sound in the sense of IL ⊢ A ⇒ ML ⊢ A FD ;
• in general FD ′ is sound only in the weaker sense of
So we can say that FD ′ only really refines FD on ML, not on IL. This limitation of FD ′ is a problem if we want to apply a Friedman-Dragalin-like translation in IL. But it is not problem if we only want to apply a Friedman-Dragalin-like translation after a negative translation into ML (not just into IL).
For all formulas A we have
ML ⊢ A N 2 ↔ (A G ) FD .
For all formulas
Let us abbreviate (A G )
FD by A GFD . First we recall the definition of G writing all negations ¬A in the form A → ⊥:
Using this we unfold N 2 and GFD by induction on the structure of formulas:
, which is equivalent in IL to F , would be equivalent in IL to a formula in NF, contradicting point 2 of lemma 7.
2. If N 1 would act as the identity on NF in IL, then IL ⊢ ⊥ N 1 ↔ ⊥ (since ⊥ ∈ NF) where ⊥ N 1 ≡ ⊥ ∨ F , so IL ⊢ ¬F , contradicting the assumption IL ¬F .
Proposition 12 suggests that the two properties relative to NF may tell the difference between the usual negative translations into IL and other negative translations into IL. Indeed, now we prove that they characterise the usual negative translations into IL. 1. N is equivalent in IL (respectively, ML) to G.
N translates into NF in IL (respectively, ML).

N acts as the identity on NF in IL (respectively, ML).
Proof. We do the proof only for negative translations into IL since the case of negative translations into ML is analogous.
(1 ⇒ 2) By direct proof, if N is equivalent in IL to G, then N translates into NF in IL because G does so, as we wanted.
(2 ⇒ 3) By direct proof, assume that N translates into NF in IL, consider an arbitrary formula A ∈ NF and let us prove IL ⊢ A N ↔ A. By assumption the formula A N is equivalent in IL to a formula in NF, and we have A ∈ NF, so the formula A N ↔ A is equivalent in IL to a formula in NF. Since CL ⊢ A N ↔ A by the characterisation theorem of N, and since CL is conservative over IL with respect to NF, we have IL ⊢ A N ↔ A, as we wanted. (1) and (2) we get IL ⊢ A N ↔ A G , as we wanted.
Another property shared by the usual negative translations into IL is idempotence in IL, that is N • N = N in the sense of: IL ⊢ (A N ) N ↔ A N for all formulas A. Idempotence in IL is sometimes proved using the properties relative to NF. The proof roughly proceeds like this: if N is a negative translation into IL that (1) translates into NF in IL and (2) acts as the identity on NF in IL, then A N ∈ NF by (1), so IL ⊢ (A N ) N ↔ A N by (2) . (This argument is not rigorous since from (1) we only get that A N is equivalent in IL to a formula in NF, not that A N ∈ NF.) This relation of idempotence in IL with the properties relative to NF can make us suspect that idempotence in IL also characterises the usual negative translations into IL. But this is not so because, as we will show now, all negative translations into IL are idempotent in IL (but not equivalent in IL, as we already saw). 
Conclusion
The main three points of this article are the following.
Conjecture The fact that the usual negative translations into IL are equivalent in IL leads to the conjecture: if we rigorously define the notion of a negative translation into IL, then we should be able to prove that all negative translations are equivalent in IL.
